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Abstract 
The purpose of this analysis is to explore the application of commercial 
smartphone technology in the United States Marine Corps (USMC) tactical 
environment. Based on our research and financial analysis, we conclude that the 
dual-use potential of smartphones makes their economics more attractive than the 
existing radios the USMC has available, and, therefore, the business case for 
deploying sleeved smartphones in the tactical environment complements the military 
rationale for adopting this technology. Because uncertainty exists about what the 
true productivity benefits of smartphones might or might not be for different kinds of 
USMC users, we recommend that the USMC adopt a staged investment approach to 
smartphones, starting with a substantive trial of the technology in order to better 
understand the potential economic benefits.  
Keywords: Smartphone, Tactical Environment, Mobile Device, 
Telecommunications 
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Smartphones in the Tactical Environment:  
A Framework for Financial Analysis of U.S. 
Marine Corps Options 
Introduction and Background 
Introduction 
In 2013, the typical U.S. teen sends 3,339 text messages a month (i.e., over 
100 per day). 
The original proposal on which this report was based started with the premise 
that smartphones of the kind used by the typical U.S. teen might have tactical utility 
for the United States Marine Corps (USMC). Some of the same teens mentioned 
above go on to become newly minted USMC riflemen. So why not take a technology 
that they use ubiquitously in their personal lives and apply it to improve their 
warfighting capabilities and their productivity? After all, some Marines already BYOD 
(bring your own device) when authorized by their commander or acquire mobile 
cellular capabilities from local providers while deployed. In other words, they are 
even willing to bring their own gear/stuff to work in order to work faster and better 
(i.e., more productively). Some of those productivity benefits undoubtedly spill over 
and are captured by the Department of Defense (DoD). 
In our proposal, we posited the potential value of a secure mobile virtual 
network operator (sMVNO) concept for USMC tactical operations as a way of 
implementing smartphones over a private cellular network. Since we wrote the 
proposal, quite a lot has changed in the fast-moving tactical communications 
environment: The technical options are evolving at a clip, USMC requirements have 
changed, and—not least of all—the budgetary environment (with sequestration and 
a likely budget drawdown) has altered considerably with several of the USMC 
budget priorities cut back significantly, including some in the command and control 
(C2) area. USMC end strength, currently at 195,000, will almost certainly fall, 
perhaps by as much as a quarter in the medium term (to around 150,000) depending 
on future congressional appropriations. Certainly, the prospects of a significant 
USMC end-strength reduction cannot be ignored. 
The good news is that opportunities for deploying smartphones via DoD 
private cellular networks have increased and offer one potential way of soaking up 
some of the USMC end-strength reduction by improving the warfighting capabilities 
and productivity of the individual Marines that remain and, consequently, the Corps 
as a whole compared to what it would otherwise be. It is the usual story: a smaller 
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fighting force, but one that packs more punch per rifleman/sailor/pilot. Achieving this 
requires innovation in the way the USMC does things, something that is already high 
on the strategic agenda at the USMC, as emphasized in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. USMC Planning Guidance  
(Naval Research Advisory Committee [NRAC], 2012) 
The analysis we provide in this report is designed with this guidance in mind. 
We see the combination of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) smartphones and 
COTS private cellular networks integrated with military hardware and software as 
providing innovation potentialities that are well worth further analysis and 
experimentation. The report reflects the most up-to-date information that is available 
to us about the directions that the USMC and DoD are following for deploying 
smartphones and private cellular networks. This looks like it will not include the 
sMVNO concept we mooted a year ago, so in the report we focus on analyzing two 
more likely paths of smartphone and cellular network adoption:  
 the deployment of a secure H2 smartphone sleeve to increase 
capabilities at the squad level (a project already initiated by 
MARCORSYSCOM (Marine Corps systems command) under the 
MOBILITY JCTD); and  
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 the deployment of Oceus Networks private cellular systems to increase 
the capabilities of the company combat operations center (COC; a 
project similar to one already developed via the JOLTED TACTICS 
JCTD, of which the U.S. Army has already initiated purchases). 
Importantly, the report is designed to be of practical use to USMC 
stakeholders, specifically staff at MARCORSYSCOM, and potentially also in the U.S. 
Army, which is considering similar initiatives to the USMC.  
Our basic conjecture is that sleeved smartphones may be not just militarily 
justifiable owing to their tactical utility, but are financially justifiable based on their 
dual-use economics: They may pay for themselves by generating productivity 
benefits for Marines while dwelling at home station, even if we attribute zero financial 
benefits for the days the phones are deployed in the field. Or, to put the same point 
in a different way, if a sleeved smartphone offers similar tactical utility to the PRC-
152 and PRC-153 radios currently used, then the tactical benefits are a “wash” in the 
financial analysis, and we can therefore ignore them. Instead, we can focus on the 
relative costs of the different alternatives and on their potential for productivity 
benefits. In fact, there may be a financial case for adopting smartphones without an 
H2 sleeve for non-tactical use, simply based on their productivity benefits. We 
explore these alternatives in this report.  
Our approach is to examine the business-case analysis (BCA) for sleeved 
smartphone and private cellular network adoption by analyzing a reasonable set of 
assumptions around this issue, but we acknowledge that we have made many 
simplifications in our approach. Partly, this is owing to constraints (i.e., data 
incompleteness). But, just as importantly, these simplifications are a choice. For 
example, we know that salaries vary among riflemen according to the exact rank 
make up in a particular squad, platoon, or company. However, for the most part, we 
use an E1 salary as a benchmark for evaluating the BCA. This is not because we 
don’t know better; it is because it reduces the number of assumptions we make in 
the analysis, keeps the math more simple and therefore more transparent, and 
makes it easier for others to replicate or test and alter. Also, it means we have made 
some choices about what we think are the key drivers of the analysis, the factors 
that really make a difference in producing the main results. Because our approach is 
high level (we make some very general assumptions), our analysis is in fact best 
thought of as a “first cut” that will be useful in helping to frame the business case 
for/against smartphone and cellular network adoption and to point to where some 
more detailed analyses might be worth doing. 
As a preview of our findings, the main conclusion we draw is that the dual-use 
potential of smartphone technology makes the economics more attractive than the 
existing radios USMC has available. Hence, the business case for deploying tactical 
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sleeved smartphones complements the military rationale for adoption. The big 
economic benefit of smartphones will be in how they enable Marines to work smarter 
when at their home base as well as fighting better when deployed (if that in fact 
proves to be the case).  
We draw a second important conclusion concerning the implementation of 
smartphones in light of uncertainty about exactly what their productivity benefits 
might be. The key point is that there is no substitute for actually trialing the 
technology to find out more about the benefits case. Therefore, it would make a lot 
of sense for the USMC to adopt a staged investment plan where it deploys, for 
example, 1,000 smartphones across a wide variety of users and then collects data 
on the actual productivity benefits that accrue. A larger scale roll-out of smartphones 
would be contingent on the results of the test stage.  
The Context for Tactical Smartphone Adoption  
Smartphone Diffusion Is Happening at a Rapid Clip 
People like having a mobile computer in their pockets. The market 
penetration of mobile phones is already over 100% in the United States (102% in 
2012), which trails Europe, where diffusion averages 126% in the six biggest 
European countries (Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Poland, and 
Spain). In many ways, this tells its own story: Households obviously find mobile 
phones a compelling proposition whose value to the household (or individual) 
significantly outstrips what they have to pay to acquire mobile service. 
Consumers are quickly transitioning from mobile phones to smartphones, 
which are experiencing a tremendous growth in sales (see Figure 2). In the United 
States, Nielson research reported that smartphone penetration of the mobile phone 
market is 75% among 18–24-year-olds, 78% among 25–34-year-olds, and 61% in 
the total market (Mashable, 2013). The United States is among six countries globally 
with smartphone penetration rates greater than 50%. 
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Figure 2. World-Wide Computing and Smartphone Diffusion 
The Emerging Gap Between Tactical and Commercial Mobile 
Communication Technologies 
Figure 3 shows a slide offered by General Peter Chiarelli at the Institute for 
Defense and Government Advancement (IDGA) conference at the Navy War 
College (NWC) on January 28, 2009. Using peak data rate as a key metric, the slide 
shows that commercial mobile technologies have been outstripping tactical mobile 
technology development, opening up a gap (the light blue area) between the 
capabilities on offer. The general’s message was that the DoD should start 
leveraging COTS mobile technologies more effectively.  
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Figure 3. Gap Between Tactical and Commercial Communications 
Technologies  
(Chiarelli, 2009) 
It is worth highlighting that this trend is driven by the high level of commercial 
research and development (R&D) spend on mobile technology development. Some 
sources suggest commercial firms are spending $60 billion/year on competitive R&D 
in this industry (Oceus Networks, 2013). As this year-on-year spend accumulates, it 
significantly outstrips DoD R&D spend on proprietary mobile communications, 
leading to the observed gap in Figure 3. Based on the DoD budget outlook, it is 
unlikely that this gap will close and rather more likely that the gap between 
proprietary and COTS may continue to grow in upcoming years. 
This gap between proprietary and COTS system would not matter if DoD 
entities didn’t want the capabilities that very high data rates coupled with powerful 
smartphones can offer, such as full-motion video, powerful mapping and 
visualization capabilities, and a raft of productivity-improving applications. However, 
these capabilities are highly desirable for our tactical forces. We need to have them, 
and we need to acquire them faster than our adversaries do. To do so requires that 
we find some mechanisms for leveraging fast-improving COTS technology, suitably 
adapted for our military’s needs. 
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The Private-Public Productivity Gap 
Accompanying this mobile technology gap, some evidence suggests that an 
important productivity gap has opened up between the private and public sectors 
over the past 25 years. 
U.S. budget director Peter Orszag (2010) highlighted that there is a growing 
productivity gap between the public and private sectors. “Government too often is 
inefficient and wasteful, he argued, and Americans are rightly skeptical about its 
ability to perform effectively” (Eggers & Jaffe, 2013, p. 6). Orszag (2010) highlighted 
that historically public and private productivity were very similar. But starting in 1987, 
private-sector productivity improvements picked-up, while in the public sector after 
2000 data suggests productivity actually fell (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Private and Public Sector Productivity in the United States 
(Eggers & Jaffe, 2013)  
Orszag (2010) argued that citizens perceptions of government inefficiency 
were being fueled by the gap they observed between public-sector and private-
sector use of information technology and that they saw large improvements in 
efficiency and technology at work and home (the Internet, mobile devices) but not in 
their interactions with government. 
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The main message here is that there are productivity arguments for 
smartphone/private cellular network adoption by the USMC, as well tactical benefits.  
What’s Happening: Two Smartphone Investments 
Considered 
MARCORSYSCOM H2 Smartphone Sleeve  
Given the context for tactical smartphone adoption laid out in the previous 
section, various DoD initiatives are underway to leverage COTS smartphone and 
cellular networks for military use. One of these is a MARCORSYSCOM initiative to 
develop a sleeved smartphone as a Trusted H2 device under an initiative dubbed 
the Mobility JCTD (Dixon, 2013).  
An example of a smartphone sleeve is shown in Figure 5, this one from 
Lockheed Martin’s Monax system, which is called the Lynx. 
 
Figure 5. Example of Sleeved Smartphone (Dixon, 2013)  
Currently, the USMC has no plan for acquiring an alternative technology that 
will enable data at the squad or platoon level before fiscal year (FY) 2017. The 
capability gap that this represents is recognized in the USMC and could be filled by 
the Mobility JCTD. 
The basic user requirement for a Trusted H2 device is as follows: 
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 multiple small-form factor devices (i.e., smartphone and tablet sizes); 
 lightweight, sufficiently rugged device; 
 low battery use; 
 enough data storage capacity for mission requirement; 
 access to multiple data domains via cellular network, WiFi, and 
Bluetooth; 
 COTS multitasking operating system; 
 a display readable in direct sunlight and no light; 
 GPS; 
 meets security requirements; 
 voice recognition, audio alerts, push-to-talk; 
 camera; 
 and affordability (replacing instead of repairing). 
Though the Mobility JCTD is framed in terms of meeting the USMC’s tactical 
requirements, this initiative may be equally important from a productivity-enhancing 
perspective, and hence the financial parameters of the project are crucial to 
consider. This forms the basis of the BCA we assess in this study.  
JOLTED TACTICS JCTD 
One major initiative that is ongoing to develop COTS cellular technology for 
the U.S. Army is the JOLTED TACTICS JCTD. This JCTD utilizes technology from 
Oceus Networks, among other vendors, to enable secure battlefield 
communications. An illustration of how the system is envisaged is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Illustration of Oceus Networks System (Oceus Networks, 2013) 
The JOLTED TACTICS JCTD has been the major DoD venue for developing 
and evaluating Oceus Networks 4G LTE cellular technology for tactical use, 
including NSA (National Security Agency) security acceptance and the development 
of a “Deployable Spectrum Plan” for the acquisition of suitable government-owned or 
commercially owned cellular spectrum globally. 
As of the time of writing, the Army has bought 36 XIPHOS 4G LTE systems 
from Oceus Networks for $17 million (M. Liguori, personal communication, August 
2013). These systems are a small, deployable, private Cellular system that can be 
fixed or mobile (land, sea, air) and that creates a cellular network “bubble” that 
delivers tactical broadband capability (exceeding 1.5 mbps, potentially ranging up to 
several hundred mbps) over a range of up to 20 miles. If those systems work well, 
the Army may extend that purchase to between 2,000 and 5,000 Oceus Networks 
systems over time to meet aspects of its tactical communications requirements.  
At this point, JOLTED TACTICS is more of a U.S. Army initiative than a 
USMC initiative, but the capabilities offered by such a system may also be attractive 
for USMC.  
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In what follows, we consider opportunities to deploy an Oceus Networks 
cellular network to increase the capabilities of the USMC company COC. The 
alternative we consider is a highly mobile, Oceus Networks-based COC as a 
substitute (under some circumstances) to the current convention of a semi-mobile 
COC with tents, tables, communications gear, generators, and so forth. Radical 
though this might appear at this time, what we propose is a thought experiment that 
envisages a somewhat old-fashioned/traditional company COC that is composed of 
a few Humvees occupied by the company’s command staff, with all of their work 
accomplished on mobile devices (such as iPads and smartphones). Supporting this 
would be a complete virtualization of all of the software COC personnel require to 
accomplish their warfighting tasks (i.e., an entirely cloud-based IT architecture). This 
thought experiment forms the basis of the second BCA we assess in this study. 
Smartphone Benefits: Where Do They Come From? 
The Achilles heal of prior studies of smartphone technology adoption (Ball, 
2013; Dixon & O’Neal, 2011) has been identifying why smartphones generate 
benefits (causes of benefits) and how much benefit they generate (size of benefits). 
Both need to be framed clearly in order for decision-makers to have a clear idea of 
the value proposition of deploying smartphones in whatever capacity. This is true for 
evaluating the tactical benefits of having smartphones available, as well as the 
productivity benefits.  
It is worth noting that the productivity benefits of smartphones come from 
combining their capabilities with changes to organizational (or household and 
individual) processes and practices. It is important to understand that smartphones 
on their own do not improve productivity; instead, they are better viewed as an 
enabler or facilitator of productivity improvements (i.e., they help make people more 
productive by changing the ways they can accomplish tasks). However, the 
pervasiveness of mobile telecoms technology impacts on economic activity calls to 
mind the notion “general purpose technologies” described by David (1990). Such 
technologies make their impact felt by the sweeping changes they allow to 
productive arrangements, as highlighted by David’s (1990) famous study of the 
impacts of the dynamo on a wide range of manufacturing and household activities. 
Of note, it takes time—historically, several decades—for general-purpose 
technologies to bleed through the economy completely because of the cycle of 
capital investment: For example, the reorganization of U.S. manufacturing plants 
took several decades of the early 20th century (David, 1990). 
To study the benefits case for smartphones, we looked at a wide expanse of 
research, ranging from macro economic studies of cross-country comparisons of 
mobile phone use, to micro-level studies of the use of mobile devices in healthcare 
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settings (scientific studies using control groups), to case study evidence (i.e., 
anecdotal data). 
Data Collected 
Macro Economic Studies 
The impact of mobile devices is detectable at the macro level by studying 
cross-country variations in mobile phone penetration and correlating it with 
measures of economic growth and productivity improvements. The relationship 
between productivity growth and mobile phone penetration growth across a panel of 
countries is summarized in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Mobile Impact on Annual Contribution to Growth and Productivity 
(Gruber & Pantelis, 2010, p. 36) 
One important study on this topic is by Gruber and Pantelis (2010), who study 
these relationships across a large panel of countries. They conclude the following: 
The main findings show that mobile telecommunications diffusion 
significantly affects both GDP growth and productivity growth. … While 
in high income countries the mobile telecommunications contribution to 
annual GDP growth is 0.39%, for low income countries this falls to 
0.19%.  
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The growth contributions were also calculated for individual 
countries and this shows a very large range of contributions. Finland 
enjoys the highest growth contribution equal to 0.44% annually, while 
the last in the list Nepal has growth returns from mobiles of around 
0.12% annually. …  
Qualitatively similar results and rankings are also obtained by 
looking at impact of mobile telecommunications infrastructure on 
productivity growth. … The contribution of mobile telecommunications 
infrastructure to productivity growth for high penetration countries is 
close to double that of countries with low mobile penetration. (Gruber & 
Pantelis, 2010, p. 41) 
Although it is possible that the causal relationship between mobile phones 
and growth and productivity might be reversed (i.e., represent a wealth effect, with 
more mobile devices being purchased because countries are richer), it seems 
unlikely that mobile devices are not contributors to productivity improvements. To 
see why this is, one has to look at more detailed data on mobile device use, which 
we do next. In the meantime, we should hold the thought in mind that the 
overarching relationship between mobile phone penetration and productivity or GDP 
growth could flow causally in both directions (i.e., be a case of reciprocal causation).  
Scientific Studies of Productivity Impacts of Mobile Devices in the 
Healthcare Industry 
One research literature that has conducted many studies on the use of 
technology in improving productivity is healthcare (West, 2012). A systematic review 
of 13 studies of mobile handheld technology was conducted by Prgomet et al. 
(2007). These studies in general are well done, benefitting from the general practice 
in the healthcare and medical literature of using control groups to compare with the 
results of a treatment group (in the case of these studies, the “treatment” group was 
the group using the new technology). The review found that personal digital 
assistants (PDAs) positively impacted response times and error prevention, and 
provided superior data management and accessibility. The greatest benefits 
occurred when time was a critical factor (i.e., when rapid response was crucial). 
These results seem very relevant for tactical use of smartphones by the USMC.  
For example, in a study by Adams et al. (2006), emergency department 
nurses wirelessly forward electrocardiograph (ECG) images to a cardiologist’s PDA, 
finding that there was significantly shorter door-to-reperfusion time (50 minutes) 
compared with control groups (101 minutes and 96 minutes). Two other studies we 
reviewed provided qualitatively similar results. 
A different set of studies explored the issue of information accuracy (one 
measure of quality) by examining medication errors with and without PDAs. Grasso 
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et al. (2002) found that a large reduction in medication errors occurred when doctors 
made prescriptions using a PDA rather than hand-written notes that had to be 
transcribed by nurses.  
In another study, Sintchenko et al. (2005) analyzed the impact of mobile on-
the-go information access via PDAs. The setting was patient management by 
intensive care unit (ICU) physicians who were given electronic access to laboratory 
data. Results showed that a significant decrease in antibiotic prescriptions occurred, 
and the average patient length of stay in the ICU shortened significantly (13% 
decrease).  
A final interesting study is by VanDenKerkhof et al. (2003), who compared 
PDA use to paper records for patient pain management. The key factor examined 
was the comprehensiveness of information and the time it took to collect it—again, 
these are two factors that pertain strongly to the tactical military environment, where 
speedy and comprehensive information collection can be highly valuable. Results 
showed that doctors with PDAs were 25% faster collecting information and that they 
collected more comprehensive information more consistently (documented side 
effects were 5–100% for paper charting, but 98–100% for PDAs).  
Individual Case Studies 
There are a great many individual case studies described in multiple reports 
on mobile devices (for examples, see Entner, 2012; Eggers & Jaffe, 2013). Here we 
cherry-pick three key examples that are highly relevant for the USMC because they 
powerfully illustrate the impact mobile devices can have in organizational work.  
Probably the singlemost famous case study of the impact of mobile devices is 
Jensen’s (2007) study of the use of mobile phones by fishermen in the southern 
Indian state of Kerela. This case was published in Quarterly Journal of Economics 
(QJE), the top economics journal in the world, and is highly cited by other 
economists. Jensen (2007) specifically examined the “law of one price,” an 
economic prediction that claims ought to be true if information can be exchanged 
relatively without cost, because individuals will arbitrage goods from one location to 
another until any price dispersions are eliminated (i.e., they will buy low in one 
location and transfer to a higher priced location). Prior to the introduction of mobile 
phone service in Kerela, it was common for there to be many inefficiencies in the 
fishing industry, as fisherman did not know which locations had excess demand or 
supply on any given day. The result was discounted fish on some beaches, high 
priced fish in locations that were short, and significant wastage.  
Jensen (2007) examined the introduction of mobile phone services in Kerela 
between 1997 and 2001 used to communicate between fisherman (offshore, 
deciding which market to sail their catch to) and wholesalers (on the beaches, 
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observing local demand on the day, and competitor presence). He found that price 
dispersion and waste were nearly eliminated by the adoption of mobile phones, 
which increased both consumer and producer welfare.  
The case is considered powerful because it illustrates very clearly the value of 
information in making markets work efficiently, a concept that goes all the way back 
to Hayek’s (1945) observations about the use of knowledge in society and why 
socialism was bound to lead to inefficiencies compared to capitalist economies. Of 
course, the same basic principles hold true for tactical operations: Local information 
is highly valuable; to the extent that smartphones might enable superior information 
gathering and dissemination, it will give the USMC a combat edge.  
A second, very pertinent, case study comes from the United States Air Force 
(USAF) air mobility command’s adoption of iPads to meet the mapping requirements 
of aircrew (USAF, 2013). Prior to iPad adoption, aircrew carried flight bags with 
several pounds of paper maps onto the aircraft. The USAF purchased 2,725 iPads 
for $1.6 million to use as electronic “flight bags.” Probably the biggest benefit air 
crew experienced was one of the least tangible: Because of the iPad’s GPS facility, 
aircrew could search the iPad faster than they could search paper maps, so the 
iPads improved situational awareness—and therefore safety—because aircrew 
spent less time in heads-down mode, and more time heads-up. Another way of 
capturing these benefits is to say that the iPads improved aircrew productivity. 
The financial benefits were tangible in several regards and are an interesting 
model for thinking through how the USMC could improve the productivity of its 
COCs, for example. The iPads allowed the USAF to eliminate $3.2 million/year for 
printing maps and charts and $1.7 million/year in printing paper manuals (i.e., $4.9 
million/year, which is roughly a four-month payback on the iPads). In addition, the 
lower weight of the iPads (compared to paper maps) saves $0.8 million/year in 
aircraft fuel and has allowed a 90% reduction in staff hours maintaining maps and 
charts, saving a further $0.9 million/year on 22,000 staff-hours. In sum, a simple 
payback for the iPad adoption was $6.6 million on a $1.6 million investment, i.e. a 
payback of approximately three months.  
Of course, USMC helicopter pilots have their own stories of their struggles for 
iPad adoption in the cockpits of their aircraft, where iPad adoption has a similar (but 
arguably more critical) value for situational awareness in their missions. We merely 
use the USAF case here because the financial impacts of this case have been 
rigorously analyzed (USAF, 2013).  
A final example of a highly relevant mobile device adoption comes from a 
Eggers & Jaffe (2013) report on the federal adoption of smartphones. The report 
cites the example of 2,300 foster-care caseworkers in Miami-Dade County, Florida. 
Before smartphone adoption, caseworkers spent 50–80% of their total time on 
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administration. The availability of smartphones changed their work in many ways. 
They now spend less time in transit to face-to-face meetings because they can 
video-conference into them from any location. Smartphones have a silent panic 
button, which increases caseworkers safety. Caseworkers now instantly upload 
time- and location-stamped images to an online database; they also directly enter 
their case notes from the field, reducing redundant recording and entering tasks. 
Overall, the adoption of smartphones has led to a 30% increase in home visits, more 
timely reporting, and better compliance with state law (a measurable and significant 
productivity boost).  
The caseworkers example illustrates some of the ways smartphones might be 
used to improve the productivity of Marines. Instant upload of time- and location-
stamped images could be used to improve situational awareness in tactical 
operations but equally as well can be applied to home-base preparations, where the 
ability to create a maintenance order can be facilitated with an image of the gear that 
needs maintenance attention or a squad leader could send his riflemen an image of 
the exact set of gear they need to prep for the next mission. And who wouldn’t save 
time if they could video-conference into any meeting from any location in their home 
base or barracks?  
The Structure of Smartphone Benefits 
In this section, we summarize what we have learned about the basic benefits 
yielded by smartphone use. We organized them into six overarching categories: 
scavenging time, faster response times, increased information availability, speedier 
data entry, elimination of paper/printing/publishing costs, and cheap, already 
adopted technology.  
Scavenging Time From the Margins (i.e. “Multitasking”) 
Time and time again, studies indicate that the reduction of unproductive or 
semi-productive time is a major benefit of smartphones. Because these devices 
allow individuals to work from any location, they waste less time goofing off and are 
instead more likely to use marginal minutes to send or respond to a few emails (see 
data in Figure 8). This use of time results in more work getting done in marginal time 
slots, such as during the few minutes between meetings or while waiting for 
colleagues or the bus. Eggers and Jaffe (2013) quoted a study that estimated this 
additional productive time amounts to 30 minutes/day for police officers. Using 
smartphones for activities such as video conferencing reduces efficiency losses, 
such as time spent in transit between meeting locations (as noted in the Florida 
caseworker study). Surveys also indicate that people simply are available more 
hours if they are smartphone equipped: In one survey of U.S. federal employees, 
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Meritalk (2013) estimated that federal employees are connected to their work for an 
additional nine hours/week if they have a smartphone. 
 
Figure 8. Perceived Smartphone Features With the Most Benefits 
According to User Surveys  
(Hopkins, 2012) 
Faster Response Times 
Increased responsiveness resulting in reduced wait times for co-workers is 
the second major benefit of smartphones. This allows faster and better coordinated 
work flow. Research shows that  more than 80% of people keep their mobile device 
within 10 feet at all times, and  more than 90% respond to a message within 15 
minutes. A Forrester Research Inc. survey (2012) of 305 IT decision-makers found 
that 76% saw increased employee responsiveness and decision-making speed from 
the deployment of mobile devices. Reporting on a survey of Australian smartphone 
users, Hopkins (2012) stated, “When asked how working behavior has been affected 
by the added mobility a smartphone brings the most popular response was greater 
responsiveness (27%)” (p. 71). 
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Increased Information Availability 
Greater information availability is another significant benefit of smartphones. 
This is a product with the ability to conduct lightning-fast searches of enormous 
information stocks. Obvious benefits include decision support (e.g., a reduction in 
drug medication errors owing to doctors checking for drug interactions or patient 
medical history before prescribing new medicines). Research on shopping habits 
shows that shoppers are increasingly using online search while in stores in order to 
assist their shopping choices, a form of improved situational awareness. The 
USAF’s use of iPads makes a related point: an improvement in situational 
awareness stemming from automatic location tracking and rapid search available on 
an iPad compared to paper maps and charts. Improvements in the formatting and 
presentation of data can also aid situational awareness. Further benefits of 
increased information come from the multimedia capability of smartphones, in 
particular the ability to share images (a picture can be worth a thousand words) and 
to automatically time- and location-stamp images. Finally, the ability to prompt for 
information responses can be advantageous. For example, using a custom app, 
diabetes patients can receive personalized daily coaching and prompting to monitor 
blood sugar levels, nutrition, activity, and medications. This works well for diseases 
that have been shown to respond well to active management.  
Speedier Data Entry 
Reduced data entry times result in decreased costs of information gathering. 
We have already seen this in examples such as Florida caseworkers uploading 
multimedia files in seconds instead of writing up a report. The same phenomenon 
can also be seen in reduced error in data transcription when doctor’s use a PDA to 
directly input discharge instructions and prescriptions, instead of writing them by 
hand. Physician studies also show that more data gets entered when done directly 
at the patient’s bedside. Amtrak train conductors use mobile devices to enter 
maintenance work orders and update maintenance schedules, which is, again, faster 
than the old paper-based methods. Furthermore, we have already seen ways in 
which the ability to use automatic data elements—such as GPS location or time/date 
stamping—automates some elements of data entry, and therefore improves 
productivity. Automatically knowing the location of coworkers is an example. Such 
location data can be used for mapping and improving the situational awareness of 
Marines in tactical environments, or for enhancing the capability to call an ad hoc 
muster while back at home base.  
Elimination of Paper/Printing/Publishing Costs 
We saw in the USAF iPad case a detailed example of how mobile devices 
can reduce or eliminate paper and printing costs. Amazon Kindle books are a further 
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example of the same phenomenon. Moving bits is usually cheaper than 
making/printing/moving paper. 
Cheap, Lightweight, Low Power, Easy to Use, Already Adopted 
Lastly, there are certain characteristics of smartphones that flow from their 
very ubiquity: the fact that they are already adopted (therefore, the USMC does not 
have to undertake an expensive implementation or training program); that they are 
cheap, owing to the vast volumes manufactured (cheap enough to throw away 
instead of repair, and cheap enough to upgrade regularly); that they have lower 
power consumption than alternative devices; they are low weight (which matters for 
applications in military aircraft and when people are hauling them); and, finally, that 
they are easy to use (intuitive for today’s riflemen, many of whom have grown up 
using them as their main electronic communication device).  
Measuring the Benefits: Consumer Surplus 
The mix of data on the economic benefits of mobile phones suggests that 
while it is true (based on case-study and health data) that every particular situation 
has a different set of costs and benefits (which makes measurement an 
idiosyncratic, case-by-case affair), it is also true that these benefits aggregate to a 
common picture of significantly positive productivity impacts of mobile technology, 
which is visible at the country level.  
For the purposes of the analysis in this study, we wanted a broader, 
aggregate measure of benefits that—while representing an average across many 
users—could ultimately provide a robust basis for analyzing USMC options for 
smartphone deployment without having to conduct a time-and-motion study for many 
different USMC smartphone deployment opportunities. For this, we followed the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidelines, which suggest using 
“consumer surplus” as a guide to benefits, where available. 
OMB A-94 Financial Aanalysis Guidelines 
Consumer surplus is defined as “the maximum sum of money a consumer 
would be willing to pay to consume a given amount of a good, less the amount 
actually paid” (Zients 2013, p. 18). As shown in Figure 9, economists represent 
consumer surplus graphically by drawing a downward-sloping demand curve 
(representing consumer demand for the good as a function of its price) and then 
drawing a price line in the same diagram representing the price at which the good is 
available. The shaded triangle bounded by the demand curve, price line, and y axis 
represents the surplus, or benefits, consumers capture from purchasing the good.  
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Figure 9. Consumer Surplus  
(Nordicity, 2012/2013, p. 13) 
It is worth noting that while consumer surplus is a well-grounded concept that 
is frequently used in economic theory, measuring it is much more difficult. For 
example, OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperatio & Development) and 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) economists have engaged in a 
significant public debate over telecommunications policy in Mexico that in large part 
is driven by disagreements over the appropriate measurement of consumer surplus 
(OECD, 2012; Hausman & Ros, 2012). Here we follow OMB guidelines in using 
commercially available data wherever possible to make an estimate of consumer 
surplus. The following is according to OMB Circular A94 (Zients, 2012): 
Measuring Benefits and Costs. The principle of willingness-to-pay 
provides an aggregate measure of what individuals are willing to 
forego to obtain a given benefit. Market prices provide an invaluable 
starting point for measuring willingness-to-pay, but prices sometimes 
do not adequately reflect the true value of a good to society… When 
market prices are distorted or unavailable, other methods of valuing 
benefits may have to be employed. Measures derived from actual 
market behavior are preferred when they are available. 
Inframarginal Benefits and Costs. Consumers would generally be 
willing to pay more than the market price rather than go entirely without 
a good they consume. The economist's concept of consumer surplus 
measures the extra value consumers derive from their consumption 
compared with the value measured at market prices. When it can be 
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determined, consumer surplus provides the best measure of the total 
benefit to society from a government program or project. (p. 7) 
Therefore, we looked for data about actual market behavior available in prior 
studies on consumer surplus to build a picture of how it might be reasonably 
measured for smartphones.  
UK Radio Communications Agency Report 2001 
Probably the earliest econometric report on consumer surplus from mobile 
devices was published by the UK’s Radio Communications Agency in 2001. It used 
a stated preference methodology to survey 500 private and business mobile phone 
users for their willingness to pay for mobile services and then compared this to the 
prevailing prices available to compute a consumer surplus for the UK mobile sector 
(phones and pagers).  
Data indicated (“UK Radio Communications,” 2001, p. 47) that business users 
had a consumer surplus of GBP (pounds sterling) 47.18/month, amounting to 
$2.52/day.  
Consumers indicated a value of GBP16.27/month, which approximates 
$0.87/day.  
The divergence in values between private and business users is important 
because it aligns with the intuition that mobile devices may be significantly more 
valuable to organizations than to private users. 
Nordicity, Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Industry Report 
2013 
A similar set of consumer surplus calculations were conducted for the 
Canadian mobile market for 2012, including mobile broadband value as well as 
voice/text. The report (Nordicity, 2013) found the following: 
 Mobile voice/text has a consumer surplus of US$9.0 billion for 27.4 
million Canadian subscribers. This equates to $0.90/day/subscriber. 
 Mobile broadband has a consumer surplus of US$2.5 billion for 10.9 
million Canadian subscribers, which is $0.63/day/subscriber. 
 Therefore, the total consumer surplus in Canada is approximately 
$1.53/day/subscriber, across all segments of users.  
U.S. Data: Entner Report 2012 
According to Entner (2012), consumer surplus for the U.S. mobile industry 
has been estimated several times over the past decade. Economist professor Jerry 
Hausman (MIT) estimated that the U.S. consumer surplus was in the range of $80–
150 billion for 2002. At the time, industry revenues were $77 billion and there were 
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141 million wireless subscriptions. Economist professor Thomas Hazlett (George 
Mason University) testified before the U.S. Senate that the estimated U.S. consumer 
surplus was at least $80 billion per year in 2003. Based on the 141 million 
subscribers, this indicates a consumer surplus of at least $1.55/day/subscriber, 
ranging up to $2.91/day/subscriber. This data reflects mainly voice/text use. 
In 2012, industry revenues were $185 billion (CTIA, 2013). Extrapolating from 
this, Entner (2012) estimated that consumer surplus was $504 billion in 2012, taking 
into account the increased user base and lower price of mobile services. Assuming 
326 million wireless subscriptions (CTIA, 2013), this equates to a consumer surplus 
of $4.24/day/subscriber. In Entner’s analysis, 90% of this surplus was for voice. 
U.S. fixed/home broadband had 88 million subscribers in 2013 (“List of 
Countries,” 2013). Empirical analysis conducted by Greenstein and McDevitt (2012) 
for the OECD indicates that the fixed broadband connectivity generated an annual 
consumer surplus of US$95 billion in 2010 in the United States, which is 
$2.96/day/person. Based on the methodology used by Nordacity for Canada, mobile 
broadband was valued at approximately 40% of the value of fixed/home broadband, 
indicating a consumer surplus of $1.18 for the United States. There are 234 million 
mobile broadband subscribers in the United States.  
Europe-United States Comparisons 
A final methodology for indicating consumer surplus comes from cross-
country comparisons of mobile phone prices.  
Data indicates that mobile phone penetration is higher in Europe than in the 
United States, with the six largest European countries (by population) having a 
126% penetration rate, as compared to 104% for the United States. 
However, Europeans often pay considerably more for their mobile service. 
Figure 10 indicates the costs of mobile phones across OECD countries, according to 
the OECD’s (2011) report on telecommunications. This data uses a basket of 300 
calls per month (10 per day) as provide a guideline price across different markets.  
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Figure 10. OECD 300 Calls Mobile Basket, August 2010, Per Month, VAT 
Included 
(OECD, 2011, p. 261) 
The upshot of the data is that the U.S. basket price, at $51.61, is less than 
half the price of a similar service in Germany (at $105.29, with a 130% penetration 
rate). In the Netherlands, Portugal, Hungary, Israel, and Chile, users also pay double 
the U.S. price for a typical mobile phone service (the OECD average is $62.55).  
We can use the above data as a fairly strong indicator that the typical U.S. 
subscriber has a consumer surplus of at least $50/month, which is 
$1.67/day/subscriber, just based on the prices sustained in the marketplace in other 
rich, first-world, comparable economies, such as Germany and the Netherlands, and 
so forth.  
Sum Up: Range of Possible Consumer Surplus 
Table 1 summarizes the data gathered in the prior studies on consumer 
surplus. 
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Table 1. Table Summarizing Consumer Surplus Data 
Country Type of Service  Consumer Surplus $/day 
UK, 2001 Voice: Private users 0.87 
 Voice: Business users 2.52 
Canada, 2012 Voice: All users 0.90 
 Mobile broadband 0.63 
U.S., 2002/03 Voice/text: All users 1.55–2.91 
U.S., 2010 Voice/text: All users 4.24 
 Mobile broadband 1.18 
U.S.–Europe comparison Voice/text: All users 1.67 
   
Average  Voice/text (7 data points) 2.09 
Average Mobile broadband 0.90 
Sum Mobile voice & 
broadband 
2.99 
Averaging and adding these data points is admittedly a crude methodology 
for obtaining an indicative value for the consumer surplus generated by 
smartphones. However, it serves the purpose of creating an analytical baseline for 
examining the business case for adopting smartphones in various applications.  
In economic theory, “households” (individual private consumers) ought to 
value available technologies based on their utility and purchase a basket of goods 
that creates the greatest amount of utility for them. Mobile penetration rates of well 
over 100% in most developed economies—if economic theory is to be believed—
demonstrates that households believe mobile phones create surplus value (utility) 
for them.  
Moreover, in line with OMB Circular No. A-94 (Zients, 2012), cross-country 
comparisons of mobile phone prices allow us to triangulate the various consumer 
surplus analyses discussed here with actual consumer purchasing behavior in 
similar countries—a natural experiment in mobile phone valuing. Cross-country 
comparisons give us a strong basis for arguing that, whatever value consumer 
surplus really is, it is highly likely to be more than $1.67/day/subscriber, because we 
know that subscribers in other wealthy countries are willing to pay this much for their 
mobile services over and above what U.S. consumers and businesses pay. These 
measures pass the test, therefore, of being derived from actual market behavior. 
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At this point, early (2001) UK estimates of consumer surplus probably under-
represent the consumer surplus available in the UK today, because mobile service 
prices have reduced dramatically in the UK 1999–2013. Similarly, one reason why 
Entner’s (2012) U.S. estimates are higher than the estimates made in 2002/2003 is 
that prices on average are lower. Hence, the consumer surplus has been enlarged. 
One basic issue in our analysis remains: To what extent is the identifiable 
consumer surplus similar or different for organizations, rather than private users? 
The data calculated here represents an average for all users, both private and 
organizational. The UK Radio Communications Agency Report (2001) study is the 
only study we know of that specifically broke out business users from private users, 
and data there indicated that business users had a significantly higher willingness to 
pay for mobile services (and hence a significantly larger consumer surplus). This 
difference is presumably based on the productivity benefits captured by 
organizations/businesses from having their employees use mobile devices. These 
perceptions are also born out in the data we showed earlier from prior studies (see 
Figure 9) of smartphone benefits (i.e., business users do perceive significant 
benefits from having employees always connected via email, knowing their location 
via GPS, and being able to multitask from anywhere). 
Therefore, for the purposes of the foregoing analysis we will assume that 
smartphone benefits spillover to organizations, and that the heavy use of 
smartphones in organizational work is indicative that the value of smartphones to 
organizations is more likely to be above the $2.99 average indicated in Table 1 than 
below it. Alternatives to using this assumption are also discussed.  
Financial Analysis 
Methodology and Assumptions 
For this economic analysis, we are applying standard economic principles 
that account for the total operational cost of the items under consideration. This 
analysis will not only consider the direct costs of the acquisition of the smartphones 
and sleeves, but will also consider the time value of those purchases, as well as the 
operational considerations. By following standard evaluation principles, this analysis 
can be logically compared to other potential choices on an even footing. 
Operational considerations for this analysis include the fully burdened cost for 
fuel, fuel consumption, and maintenance, as well as the consumer surplus extracted 
from the deployment of the gear. Factors and assumptions are as follows. 
Net Present Value 
The standard financial evaluation methodology we use for our analysis is net 
present value (NPV). We use the OMB’s (A-94) definition of NPV: “The difference 
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between the discounted present value of benefits and the discounted present value 
of costs” (Zients, 2013, p. 19). 
In some places, we also compute internal rate of return (IRR). IRR is defined 
as the percent return for a project’s cash flows when the NPV is set to zero.  
Finally, we compute simple paybacks in some places. Simple payback is 
defined as the initial investment in year 1 divided by the subsequent cash flows and 
is stated in years.  
Inflation and Discount Rates 
A five-year period is used for this study because this is the approximate life of 
handheld smartphones. OMB Circular A-94 Appendix C (Zients, 2013) indicates that 
real interest rates on treasury notes and bonds is -0.8% for five-year maturities, and 
therefore we use this number as the discount rate in our analysis. (The nominal five-
year rate is 1.1%, and the projected inflation rate for the period is 1.9%). For 10-year 
analysis, the real discount rate of 0.1% is used, again per OMB A-94 (Zients, 2013). 
Economic Life of Equipment 
The economic life for smartphones and sleeves is assumed to be five years, 
owing to battery erosion and general wear and tear.  
20% of smartphones are assumed to be replaced every year owing to 
breakage or loss.  
All current equipment is assumed sunk cost, and therefore all analysis is 
based on marginal costs/benefits analyzed. 
Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel 
In line with DoD policy, we use the fully burdened cost of fuel (FBCF) as our 
benchmark for tactical energy cost because most electricity supplied in the tactical 
environment is obtained via portable generators. We researched an appropriate 
FBCF for this study based on Schwartz, Blakeley, and O’Rourke’s (2012) report, 
which highlights the wide variance in fuel costs experienced in tactical environments. 
The FBCF is an effort to capture the hidden costs of supplying fuel to tactical 
environments and, therefore, to aid the DoD in making appropriate analysis of 
technology alternatives by capturing the true cost of getting fuel to the location 
where a DoD entity consumes it. The CRS report (Schwartz et al., 2012) states that  
in 2010, the Marine Corps estimated the fully burdened cost of fuel in 
Afghanistan at between $9 to $16 per gallon if delivered by land, and 
between $29 to $31 per gallon if delivered by air. An Army study 
estimated the fully burdened cost of fuel in Iraq at $9 to $45 per gallon, 
depending on the type of force protection used to and the delivery 
distance, while an Air Force study estimated the fully burdened cost of 
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fuel delivered by land at $3 to $5 per gallon and $35 to $40 per gallon 
for aerial refueling. A 2008 report by the Army Environmental Policy 
Institute estimated that the fully burdened cost of fuel for a Stryker 
brigade in Iraq ranged from $14.13 to $17.44 per gallon. (p.6-7). 
Based on these estimates, we use $15/gallon as our baseline assumption, 
with a high assumption of $30/gallon and a low of $10/gallon used for our sensitivity 
analysis. 
Fuel Usage 
Fuel use for a company COC was estimated at 20 gallons/day to generate 
157 kWh on average. Of this energy requirement, 29% was estimated for 
equipment, 64% for environmental control, and the balance of 7% for other uses. 
Unit of Analysis/Force Size 
For the smartphone sleeve investment, a USMC squad is the unit of analysis, 
consisting 13 riflemen. We assumed 1,620 squads in the USMC in total. 
Companies are our unit of analysis for the Oceus Networks cellular 
infrastructure investment. A company consists of 182 Marines total, 117 of which are 
riflemen, 65 in a support role. Of these 65, 10-12 are located in the company COC, 
with the rest dispersed around the company. We assumed 225 companies in the 
USMC in total. It should be noted that these numbers are not fixed, and the 
headcount of a Marine company varies both historically and according to mission 
requirements.   
Current USMC force strength is 195,000 (as of February 2013). 
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Figure 11. USMC Rifle Company Organization  
(USMC, 1998) 
Labor Days Assumed 
We assumed Marines work 365 days/year when deployed (our base case). 
The USMC policy is two days dwelling at home station for every one day deployed in 
the field.  
For COC personnel, we assumed 365 days working. One way of looking at 
this is that smartphones are assigned to jobs rather than to individuals. Therefore, 
whoever is on duty is the smartphone owner for that job during the duty period. All 
smartphones, therefore, are assumed to work 24/7/365. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
According to OMB Circular A-94 (Zients, 2013), 
Sensitivity Analysis. Major assumptions should be varied and net 
present value and other outcomes recomputed to determine how 
sensitive outcomes are to changes in the assumptions. The 
assumptions that deserve the most attention will depend on the 
dominant benefit and cost elements and the areas of greatest 
uncertainty of the program being analyzed. (p. 11) 
For our analysis, we used the following four variables for sensitivities: 
 FBCF—average $15; low $10; high $30 / per gallon; 
 COC fuel savings—average 30%; low 10%; high 50%; 
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 Sleeve cost—average $1,100; high $2,200; and 
 Consumer surplus—average $2.99/day; low $1.50; high $6.00. 
Trusted H2 Sleeve Cost 
MARCORSYSCOM will make an initial (unrecoverable) investment in 
developing and testing a sleeve that meets its requirements. 
The Mobility JCTD states a target price for sleeves is $980 (Dixon, 2013). 
According to materials we have assessed, Lockheed Martin has quoted Lynx 
sleeves for its Monax system at $1,100. We use the $1,100 assumption for our 
analysis.  
Oceus Networks System Acquisition Cost 
We assume a single Oceus Networks system costs $450,000. For our 
baseline analysis, we assumed a salvage value of an Oceus Networks system as $1 
after five years.  
IT Virtualization 
We assume that an entirely cloud-based IT architecture is provided to 
warfighters to accomplish their combat-related tasks (when deployed) and their 
various management tasks (when at home station, training, at barracks, etc.). We do 
not cost the development of this capability into our analyses, because our 
assumption is that this capability will be provided through other USMC projects and 
programs and is therefore fixed/sunk for the purposes of this study (which is focused 
on equipment rather than software). For example, the USMC may borrow software 
features such as various apps and a virtualized Blue Force Tracker from the U.S. 
Army and adapt them at small/marginal/incremental cost. Other apps may be COTS 
that USMC adapts, or straight COTS configured by the user to meet user needs. We 
recognize that there may be some software development costs in order to gain 
incremental capability, but we assume that they are outside the scope of this study. 
Consumer Surplus 
For our base case, we assumed a consumer surplus per smartphone of 
$2.99/day based on the data we gathered from prior research (see Table 1).  
Another way of gauging this consumer surplus is to compare it to productivity 
improvements that would reflect the same dollar amount. Let us considered two 
ranks of personnel. Based on USMC labor costs for 2013, E1 rank personnel cost 
the USMC $48,041 (including benefits). Assuming a 2:1 dwell at home base (the 
USMC policy guideline), USMC personnel would spend 243 days/year at home base 
while deployed. $2.99 represents a 1.51% productivity improvement from utilizing a 
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smartphone. For O1 personnel, cost to the USMC is $82,926. Based on the same 
assumptions, $2.99 is equivalent to a 0.88% productivity increase. 
Home Base/Barracks/Combat Operations Center WIFI Infrastructure 
We assume barracks/home base and COC has WIFI or a similar service 
available at a fixed cost to the installation; therefore, smartphones are considered to 
ride on this network without generating incremental costs. However, we note that 
there is no current requirement for WIFI in deployed Marine units at the current time, 
nor at major barracks, which currently rely on commercial systems.  Using the same 
logic, we explicitly exclude cellular service from our analysis in all locations on the 
basis that it is not essential to the utility of the devices that we analyze.  
This assumption is helpful for keeping our analysis simple and focused, but 
future research should investigate the typical incremental costs that might be 
generated by providing WIFI service, including in austere locations where backhaul 
costs and data usage rates are significant enough that these costs need to be 
incorporated into the analysis of smartphone economics in order to generate a more 
complete and accurate picture.   
Equipment Maintenance Costs 
For the purposes of the analysis, we assume maintenance costs are the 
same for sleeved smartphones as for alternative devices, such as PRC-152s and 
153s. We therefore ignore these costs as a “wash” on a per-item basis. 
(Note: Currently, at the squad level, fire team leaders and squad leaders have 
communications devices; total maintenance costs might increase if every rifleman 
was equipped with a communications device because the total number of devices 
would increase substantially).  
For the COC, maintenance cost is $5,600 per month for the CAPTSET only, 
which is a conservative number that does not include the maintenance costs of the 
C2 communication systems (M. Liguori, personnel communication, September 
2013). In our analysis we reduce this cost by a target percentage to reflect the non-
use of equipment that—in our thought experiment—would be replaced by Oceus 
Networks private cellular network capability. To do this, we did a count of items of 
equipment and assumed an average cost of maintenance for each item. An Oceus 
Networks XIPHOS 4G LTE box is assumed to have the maintenance cost of one 
item. Therefore, if 50% of the current equipment in the COC is no longer needed in 
our thought experiment, we assume 50% reduced maintenance costs. 
Smartphone Costs 
We assume USMC buys commercially available smartphones that meet its 
requirements from various suppliers, such as Motorola, Samsung, Apple, and Nokia.  
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The target price for smartphones is $640 each, per the Mobility JCTD (Dixon, 
2013). We expect smartphone prices will decline over time, in line with the historical 
pattern of declining prices for such devices. For the purposes of our analysis, we 
assume a 5%/year price decline (real $).  
For COC use, some personnel may prefer a device with a larger screen, in 
which case we assume iPads or similar devices are acquired instead of a smaller 
form-factor smartphone. Costs/prices for these devices are assumed to be the 
same.  
Table 2 is a summary of all assumptions that will be incorporated into the 
economic analyses. 
Table 2. Assumptions for Economic Analyses 
Assumptions   
Riflemen in a squad 13
Additional personnel at a COC 65
Duty days per year 365
Smartphone price  $640 
H2 sleeve price  $1,100 
L-3 Guardian phone price  $3,250 
PRC-152  $4,800 
PRC-152A  $10,000 
Oceus Networks RU module (200 connections) $450,000 
Tethering equipment (smartphone to PRC-152)  $1,434 
COC equipment maintenance costs/month  $5,600 
Maintenance cost saving 50%
COC fuel use/gallons per day  20
FBC fuel  $15 
Fuel savings projected 30%
Dwell time (% at home base) 67%
Barracks efficiency benefits/productivity gain/cost saving/per 
day  $2.99 
Inflation 1.1%
Discount rate  -0.8%
# Squads in USMC (approx. 21,000 riflemen) 1620
Baseline Analysis: Squad Level (13 riflemen) 
Alternative 1: Sleeved Smartphones vs. PRC-152/152A 
The first case is the baseline of a single smartphone with the trusted H2 
sleeve. The items are purchased in year 1, with an expected life of five years (see 
Table 3). We assume that 20% of smartphones need replacing every year; 
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therefore, we built the cost of a replacement phone into the smartphone analysis. 
Sleeves are assumed to be rugged enough not to need replacing, but they will need 
maintenance. 
Table 3. Net Present Value of One Sleeved Smartphone 
In this scenario, the smartphone with sleeve has a positive net present value 
of $1,389 over a period of five years. Additionally, it demonstrates an internal rate of 
return of 44%. These benefits are gained through the application of consumer 
surplus, which is greater than the purchase price. 
Because the sleeved smartphone has a positive NPV, it makes sense to 
adopt it to obtain these benefits; however, a second part of this analysis must also 
consider the costs and benefits of the sleeved smartphone versus the current PRC-
152 radios. We assume that the Marine Corps already owns PRC-152s; therefore, 
these PRC-152s are a sunk cost and not applicable to this analysis.  
The economics of the sleeved smartphone is stronger if we assume that the 
USMC’s other option is to buy new PRC-152As ($10,000 each, with a price range of 
$10,000-30,000 depending on the particular model specified) that have a capability 
set that overlaps with the capability set a sleeved smartphone would have. Based on 
the efficiency benefits, USMC would be over $11,000 better off buying a sleeved 
smartphone than new PRC-152As (see Table 4). Using the assumption that the 
USMC would need a minimum of 2,000 devices to meet its needs at the squad 
leader level, this amounts to a $22.8 million difference in acquisition costs.  
Alternative 1: 1 sleeved smartphone   Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Smartphone & H2 Sleeve Cost    $(1,740)    $(578)     
In Barracks Efficiency (Consumer Surplus)    $731   $731  $731   $731   $731 
Annual cash flows    $(1,009)  $731  $154   $731   $731 
Discounted Cash Flow    $(1,009)  $737  $156   $749   $755 
Net Present Value  $1,389           
Internal Rate of Return 44%      
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Table 4. Comparison of Sleeved Smartphone to PRC-152/152A 
NPV of sleeved smartphone  $1,389  
PRC-152A   $(10,000) 
Price differential  $11,389  
For 2,000 units (PRC-152A)  $22.8 million  
For the purposes of the analysis, we assume maintenance costs are the 
same for sleeved smartphones as for PRC-152s and therefore can be ignored. We 
also assume the tactical utility of both items is similar and therefore can be ignored. 
In reality, the radios have some advantages over smartphones, and vice versa, 
depending on mission needs and user preferences. This smartphone option 
provides no tactical broadband (defined as a wireless network with data rates 
greater than 1.5 mbps). In effect, sleeved smartphones replace PRC-152s, but 
nothing else changes. (Of note, the more expensive PRC-152A option can provide a 
level of tactical broadband capability, having the capability to establish a 4 mbps 
tactical data-network that can be shared by other users). 
In order to demonstrate the implications of this analysis on a USMC unit, we 
chose the smallest combat organization of a squad. Typically, a squad has 13 
members, of which four currently utilize communications devices. By extending the 
prior analysis from a single smartphone with sleeve to 13 devices (one each for 
every squad member) the NPV increased to $19,700 and achieved an internal rate 
of return of 50% (see Table 5 below). 
Table 5. Net Present Value of Sleeved Smartphones for a Squad 
Alternative 1A: Squad Level 
Analysis: Smartphones with 
tactical sleeves   Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Smartphone & H2 sleeve cost 
(13 units)    (22,620)
 





In barracks efficiency 
(consumer surplus)    9,506  9,506  9,506   9,506   9,506 
Annual cash flows   
 
(13,114)  7,925  8,004   8,079   8,150 
Discounted cash flow   
 
(13,114)  7,989  8,134   8,276   8,416 
NPV of sleeved smartphone 
 
19,700           
Internal rate of return 50%      
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Alternative 2: Smartphones for Barrack’s Use Only 
The second alternative to consider is to look at the use of the smartphone as 
a communications and management tool in the home base/barracks environment. 
This is the area where some Marines are currently using personal smartphones for 
their daily lives. For this analysis, we consider a 13-person squad that will employ 
sleeveless phones for official management and communications tasks. There will be 
no changes to tactical equipment, and we assume that there is no tactical 
broadband available. 
Table 6. Smartphones for Barracks Use Only 
Alternative 2: 
Smartphones only for 
barracks use   Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 











In barracks efficiency 
(consumer surplus)    $9,506  $9,506  $9,506   $9,506   $9,506 
Annual cash flows    $1,186  $7,925  $8,004   $8,079   $8,150 
Discounted cash flow    $1,186  $7,989  $8,134   $8,276   $8,416 
NPV of sleeved 
smartphone 
 
$34,000           
In this scenario, the smartphone with sleeve has a positive NPV of $34,000 
over a period of five years (see Table 6). These benefits are gained through the 
application of consumer surplus, which is greater than the purchase price. 
Alternative 3: Smartphones Sharing 1/14 Oceus Networks System 
(No Sleeves) 
The next alternative for the squad level involves a shared Oceus Networks 
system paired with smartphones for each member of the squad. The Oceus 
Networks system is the Army’s JOLTED TACTICS capability and will require upfront 
investment cost for the USMC. For this analysis, which is at the squad level, we are 
assuming that each squad requires only 1/14 of the total system; thus, only those 
costs will be considered. We recognize that an entire Oceus Networks system will 
need to be purchased, thus providing capabilities for multiple squads. 
Operationally, this alternative provides for tactical broadband capability, which 
will enhance the ability for the user to gain functionality from the smartphones. 
Additionally, this analysis does not consider local spectrum or transmission costs, 
such as satellite communications. This option is only viable in permissive 
environments and may require host country approval (see Table 7). 
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Table 7. Oceus Networks System With Smartphones 
Alternative 3: 1/14th Oceus 
system with smartphones Real $ Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Smartphones plus 1/14 Oceus 
system   
 
(40,463)  (1,581)  (1,502)  (1,427) 
 
(1,355)
In barracks efficiency 
(consumer surplus)   9,506  9,506  9,506   9,506   9,506 
Annual cash flows   
 
(30,957)  7,925  8,004   8,079   8,150 
Discounted cash flow   
 
(30,957)  7,989  8,134   8,276   8,416 
NPV of Oceus with 
smartphones 
 
$1,858           
Internal rate of return 2%           
The NPV of this alternative is less than the sleeved phones option due to the 
need for greater investment in the first year. However, this option does have a 
positive NPV and internal rate of return, thus making it economically viable. With the 
additional capabilities the Oceus Networks system provides regarding tactical 
broadband, this alternative may be attractive to the commander. 
Alternative 4: L-3 Guardian Option Sharing 1/14 Oceus Networks 
System 
Concerns may exist about the use of commercial technology in the tactical 
environment when secure systems are required. The L-3 Guardian was developed 
with oversight by the National Security Agency (NSA) to enable classified 
communications using both voice and data. The L-3 Guardian is configured to allow 
both classified and unclassified communications over commercial as well a 
government networks. This alternative also allows for tactical broadband capability. 
Although the L-3 Guardian does not require a sleeve for secure 
communications, it is more expensive and its ability to be upgraded depends on 
government contracts. The price for a single L-3 Guardian is $3,250. This alternative 
looks at the incorporation of the L-3 Guardian into the Oceus system at the squad 
level. This alternative will consider 1/14 use of the Oceus capacity.  
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Table 8. Alternative 4: L-3 Guardian Plus 1/14 Oceus Networks System 
Alternative 4: L-3 Guardian plus 
1/14th Oceus    Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
L-3 Guradian phones plus 1/14 










In barracks efficiency (consumer 
surplus)    9,506  9,506  9,506   9,506  9,506 
Annual cash flows   
 
(64,887)  1,056  1,056   1,056  1,056 
Discounted cash flow   
 
(64,887)  1,064  1,073   1,081  1,090 
NPV of L-3 Guardian phones plus 
1/14 Oceus system 
 
(60,579)           
This alternative has a negative NPV due to the high cost of investment in both 
the Oceus systems as well as the L-3 Guardian phones (see Table 8). With 
productivity being the sole benefit, this approach would not achieve a positive NPV 
due to the need to update the technologies. However, this might still be a viable 
option when security is of primary consideration. 
Alternative 5: Tethered Smartphone Concept (Tethered to PRC-152) 
The U.S. Army developed a concept where a smartphone could be physically 
tethered to a PRC-152A radio to allow for some additional capabilities. This solution 
adds minimal costs to an existing squad if we assume that the current inventory of 
one PRC-152A per squad would remain unchanged. However, in order to provide a 
comparison point to a sleeved smartphone capability, in the current analysis we 
analyze the cost of providing all 13 members of a squad with a smartphone tethered 
to a PRC-152A. This option would not provide tactical broadband capabilities.
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Table 9. Smartphones With Tethered PRC-152As (Squad Level) 
Alternative 5: Smartphones 
plus Tethered 152s    Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Smartphone plus PRC-152A plus 
tethering equipment    (89,362)
 





In barracks efficiency (consumer 
surplus)    9,506  9,506  9,506   9,506  9,506 
Annual cash flows   
 
(79,856)  7,925  8,004   8,079  8,150 
Discounted cash flow   
 
(79,856)  7,989  8,134   8,276  8,416 
NPV smartphones with tethered 
PRC-152As  (47,042)           
This alternative (see Table 9) has a negative NPV due to the high cost of 
providing each Marine with a PRC-152A in addition to a smartphone and the 
tethering equipment. This might be a viable alternative for initial testing, where no 
additional PRC-152As need to purchased. However, this option becomes very 
expensive because of the need to purchase new $10,000 PRC-152As (instead of a 
$1,100 sleeve) plus $1,434 of tethering equipment, in addition to the cost of 
smartphones. 
Table 10 provides a summary of results for a 13-person squad. 
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Table 10. Table Summarizing Net Present Values for a 13-Person Squad 
 Alternative Option 5-year NPV  
1 Single-sleeved smartphone $1,389 
1b 13 smartphones w/secure sleeves $19,700 
2 13 barracks-only smartphones $34,000 
4 Smartphones sharing Oceus 
Networks system 
$1,858 
4 Guardian L-3 sharing Oceus 
Networks system 
$-60,579 
5 Smartphones tethered to PRC-
152As 
$-47,042 
Baseline Analysis: Company Level Analysis  
The next alternatives look at the application of smartphones at the company 
level. In these scenarios, there are two different manners in which the company level 
is considered. First is the COC and support staff of 65 riflemen total, and second is 
the whole company that comprises 182 people.  
Alternative 6: 65 Smartphones for support/COC personnel + 1 Oceus 
Networks XIPHOS 4G LTE System 
This alternative provides smartphones to the 65 support riflemen of a 
company (without H2 sleeves) and a standalone Oceus Networks system. The 
benefit of this configuration is that it provides tactical broadband capabilities that 
allow for greater functionality on the smartphones. This is similar in structure to the 
Army’s JOLTED TACTICS system, but it does not require tethering. 
Providing the smartphones to only the tactical side reduces the power and 
maintenance footprint and inherently makes the COC more mobile. This also 
assumes that the company retain 50% of existing equipment, such as the PRC-152 
and PRC-117 (see Table 11 for results). 
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Table 11. Alternative 6: COC Standalone Oceus Networks system plus 
Smartphones (No Sleeves) 
 Alternative 6: COC 
standalone Oceus Network 
(no sleeves)   Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Equipment cost: Oceus + 65 
smartphones    (491,600)  (7,904)  (7,509)  (7,133)  (6,777)
Oceus salvage value            $1 
100% efficiency benefits    70,938  70,938  70,938   70,938  70,938 
Avoided maintenance cost    33,600  33,600  33,600   33,600  33,600 
Avoided fuel costs    32,850  32,850  32,850   32,850  32,850 
Annual cash flows    (354,212)  129,484  129,879   130,254 
 
130,612 





176,606           
Alternative 7: 65 Sleeved Smartphones for support/COC personnel + 
1 Oceus Networks XIPHOS 4G LTE System  
This alternative provides smartphones for 65 members of the company but 
also adds the trusted H2 sleeves. This is potentially the best-case scenario 
operationally because it provides both the flexibility of the Oceus Networks capability 
plus the security of the trusted H2 sleeve. However, because of the sleeve, this 
option does not proved for tactical broadband capability. The NPV for alternative 7 is 
lower than alternative 6 dues to the inclusion of the H2 sleeves (see Table 12). 
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Table 12. COC Oceus Networks system with Smartphones and Sleeves (for 
65 personnel)  
Alternative 7: COC Oceus 
Networks + smartphones + 
sleeves   Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Year 
5 
equipment cost: Oceus 
Networks/smartphones/ 
sleeves (65)   
 




Oceus salvage value            $1 




































NPV  105,106           
Alternative 8: Smartphones + Sleeves + Oceus Networks System for 
Entire Company (182 personnel) 
This final alternative takes the last example and extends it to all 182 members of a 
company (Table 13). This option is similar in functionality to the Army JOLTED 
TACTICS except we use trusted H2 sleeves for communications rather than 
tethering. This alternative does not provide for tactical broadband. The NPV is 
largest for this option, as well as the investment cost due to the expectation of 
consumer surplus across a larger baseline. The consumer surplus accounts for 
about 65% of the generated value and is thus the driving factor in this analysis.
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Table 13. COC Oceus Networks With Smartphones and Sleeves (for 182 
personnel) 
Alternative 8: COC Oceus 
Networks + smartphones + 
sleeves   Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Equipment cost:  
Oceus/smartphones/sleeves (182)    (766,680)  (22,131)  (21,025)  (19,973)  (18,975)
Oceus salvage value            $1 
100% efficiency benefits    156,489  156,489  156,489   156,489  156,489 
Avoided maintenance cost    33,600  70,938  70,938   70,938  70,938 
Avoided fuel costs    32,850  32,850  32,850   32,850  32,850 
Annual cash flows    (543,741)  238,145  239,252   240,303  241,303 
Discounted cash flow    (543,741)  240,066  243,126   246,164  249,181 
NPV  434,796           
Table 14 provides a summary of results at the company for either 65 support 
staff or the entire company of 182 people. 
Table 14. Net Present Value Comparison at the Company Level 
Option  5-year NPV $ 
65 smartphones + Oceus system 176,606 
65 sleeved smartphones + Oceus system 105,106 
182 sleeved smartphones + Oceus system 434,796 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The purpose of a sensitivity analysis is to determine whether there might be 
large changes to the NPV depending on the assumptions applied to the analysis. In 
the analysis of alternatives, we applied consistent and conservative estimates of 
costs and savings that might be realized. However, there is room for potential cost 
overruns and benefits that do not materialize at the expected rate. 
Based on the original assumptions listed in Table 2 we applied several 
changes to those assumptions to determine whether there would be significant 
impacts that might change the way we considered the results. Table 15 compares 
changes to the H2 sleeve price, increasing it to $2,200 per unit. Additionally, we 
provide a comparison changing the consumer surplus to a low of $1.50/day to a high 
of $6.00/day. In each case, the alternative NPV is reflected. The columns in Table 
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15 with blue type indicate the original assumption that went into the analysis. In this 
analysis, we changed only one variable at a time, leaving all others at the level of the 
original assumptions. 
The major outcome of this analysis is that the NPV for most alternatives shifts 
from positive to negative under the $1.50/day consumer surplus assumption, 
indicating that the precise assumption about consumer surplus is a key 
consideration in the business case. By comparison, the NPV results are robust to a 
doubling of the price of sleeves. Of note, higher consumer surplus assumptions 
would drive big upsides in the NPV for many of the alternative considered.  
Table 15. Sensitivity Analysis: NPV Adjusted for Sleeve Price or Consumer 
Surplus 
  Sleeve Price   Consumer Surplus   
Alternative Average ($1100) High ($2200) Low ($1.50) Average ($2.99) High ($6.00) 
1  $1,389   $289   $(463)  $1,389   $5,129  
2  $34,000   $34,000   $9,931   $34,000   $82,625  
3  $1,858   $1,858   $(22,212)  $1,858   $50,482  
4  $(60,579)  $(60,579)  $(84,649)  $(60,579)  $(11,955) 
5  $(47,042)  $(47,042)   $(71,111)  $(47,042)  $1,583  
6  $176,606   $176,606   $(3,019)  $176,606   $539,473  
7  $105,106   $33,606   $(74,519)  $105,106   $467,973  
8  $434,796   $237,657   $(102,671)  $434,796   $1,529,796  
The next part of the sensitivity analysis impacted only alternatives 6, 7, and 8. 
When we analyzed the alternatives at the company level, we considered the fully 
burdened cost of fuel (FBCF), as well as the projected fuel savings. These were not 
considerations at the squad level. In this analysis, we showed the FBCF at a low of 
$10, an average of $15, and a high of $30. The fuel savings were a low of 10%, an 
average of 30%, and a high of 50%. The NPV for each alternative is shown in Table 
16. 
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Table 16. Sensitivity Analysis: FBCF and Fuel Savings 
















$120,966   $176,606  $343,526  $65,325  $176,606   $287,886 
7  $49,466   $105,106  $272,026  $(6,175)  $105,106   $216,386 
8 
 
$426,907   $434,796  $470,707  $323,515  $434,796   $546,076 
This analysis suggests that the NPV results are robust to downside 
assumptions about the FBCF and fuel savings. Indeed, there is considerable upside 
potential if FBCF and fuel savings are higher than assumed in the base case. 
The final part of this analysis is to show a best- and worst-case scenario for 
each alternative, thus highlighting the entire range of possible results. This helps the 
decision-maker determine what might be the case if all assumptions are either over- 
or underestimated. Although this situation may not present itself in most cases, 
understanding both the upside and downside risks adds credibility to the analysis. 
When defining the best- and worst-case scenarios, we made the following 
assumptions: 
 Best case: Sleeve cost ($1100), consumer surplus ($6.00), FBCF 
($10), and fuel savings (50%). 
 Worst case: Sleeve cost ($2200), consumer surplus ($1.50), FBCF 
($30), and fuel savings (10%). 
The average case was the original analysis. The total variance was the 
differential between the best- and worst-case scenarios. 
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Table 17. Sensitivity Analysis Best- and Worst-Case Scenarios 
  Worst Case Average Case Best Case Total Variance 
Alternative         
1  $(1,863)  $1,389   $5,129   $6,992 
2  $9,931  $34,000   $82,625   $72,694 
3  $(22,212)  $1,858   $50,482   $72,694 
4  $(84,649)  $(60,579)  $(11,955)  $72,694 
5  $(71,111)  $(47,042)  $1,583   $72,694 
6  $(58,660)  $176,606   $558,019   $616,679 
7  $(221,160)  $105,106   $486,519   $707,679 
8  $(416,172)  $434,796   $1,545,282   $1,961,454 
The results of the sensitivity analysis (shown in Table 17) are revealing, 
particularly for decisions made at the squad level. The total variance for alternatives 
2, 3, 4 and 5 are all exactly the same, which is to be expected considering that the 
change in variables was limited to the sleeve cost and the consumer surplus. 
Although this is revealing, it does not tell the entire story. Alternative 2 (smartphones 
for barracks use only) is the least risky, having the only positive worst-case scenario, 
and the highest average and best-case scenarios. Conversely, alternative 4 (L-3 
Guardian phone with Oceus Networks system) is the riskiest, with negative NPV for 
all scenarios. 
At the company level, all three alternatives are negative in the worst-case 
scenario and have moderate returns on average, but the best-case scenario for 
alternative 8 grows very large. This is primarily driven by the consumer surplus, 
which applies to a larger group of people.  
Across the board, consumer surplus (productivity gains) had the single 
greatest influence on the NPV values, will likely be a primary driver in the decision-
making, and therefore is the variable most in need of further research. 
Staged Investment (Real Options) Analysis 
One method that organizations use to mitigate risk and increase flexibility is 
the application of real options. Through this approach, decision-makers have the 
right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an asset at some pre-determined time in 
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the future. This right provides an opportunity to break investments into stages. An 
early stage is used to determine whether a risky investment produced the expected 
returns, and later stages proceed contingent on this information being better 
understood. 
Real options are analogous to financial options that are commonplace in the 
markets. Two basic types of options exist that allow for the purchase of an asset 
(call option) or the sale of an asset (put option) at some predetermined time in the 
future at a set price (exercise or strike price). Depending on the movement of the 
market, the holder of the option may or may not exercise that option at the point 
where the opportunity is to expire. This is where the risk lies with options. In financial 
options, a buyer purchases the right to buy or sell an asset at a predetermined time 
and at a set price in the future. If market conditions are favorable (i.e., if the market 
price has risen or declined sufficiently), then the holder of the option may exercise 
the option and extract a profit. However, if the market price has not changed enough 
to place the option holder “in the money,” then the options expire and the holder 
loses the initial investment but nothing else. 
The structure of real options demonstrates that while options are intended to 
mitigate risk, they are not completely risk-free. In order for real options to mimic 
financial options, the option buyer must be willing to not exercise the option if the 
market conditions are not favorable. Thus, if the holder of the option is obligated to 
exercise, the transaction cannot be considered an option. The benefit comes from 
the simple philosophy that options provide time for the buyer to assess market 
conditions. If market conditions are favorable, then the buyer exercises the options 
and creates value for the organization. However, if the market conditions are not 
favorable, the buyer will not exercise and will lose the investment in the options. The 
purchase to time to assess market conditions creates the value of financial options 
and, by association, real options. 
In the scenario we are discussing here, the USMC may apply an options 
approach toward the integration of smartphones into tactical operations. 
Fundamentally, for the smartphone investment considered here, our sensitivity 
analysis suggests the size of the consumer surplus is an important variable about 
which some uncertainty exists. Because of this uncertainty, it may make sense to 
invest in stages, using information gained about the consumer surplus early stages 
to inform later stage investments. There are unknowns concerning the robustness, 
security, and adaptability of smartphones in the tactical environment. Therefore, a 
less risky place to test the concept with an early stage investment might be in a 
continental United States (CONUS) garrison environment and use the information 
gathered as an input into later stage investments. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó - 46 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
Smartphones Only Stages (In Order to Test Productivity Benefits 
First) 
As we highlighted in our Introduction, the best way to actually find out what 
the productivity benefits of smartphones is for the USMC would be to buy a batch of 
1,000 phones, deploy them on an experimental basis for use as a productivity tool 
while dwelling at home base or in barracks, and then rigorously measure the impacts 
on various tasks Marines do in their everyday routines.  
We broke the analysis into a three-part staged analysis where investment in 
future years would be made only if success was realized from prior investments. For 
the first option, we chose to analyze outfitting 1,000 Marines with smartphones and 
nothing else. As with prior analyses, we assume that there is a need for a 20% 
replacement each year and the real price of smartphone technology goes down by 
5% per year. The assumption is that the Marines are in their home base/garrison 
and are not deployed. For the purpose of comparison of this option to follow-on, we 
chose to extend the analysis through 10 years.  
The second option would take place in year 3 of the 10 year run, if the 
analysis proved that the first option provided the projected benefits. This option 
would extend the smartphones to three divisions of Marines, or 20,000 people. 
Again, the Marines would receive a smartphone and nothing else.  
The same assumptions of price, discount rate, and consumer surplus that 
were used for prior analyses apply here as well. As with prior analyses, we assume 
that there is a need for a 20% replacement each year and that the real price of 
smartphone technology goes down by 5% per year. 
The final option (option 3) would take place in year 5 and run through year 10. 
In this option, the plan is greatly expanded to bring the smartphone to the tactical 
environment. In this case, we analyze adding the Oceus Networks system to three 
divisions, assuming an average of 50% capacity utilization across 20,000 users. 
Additionally, the trusted H2 sleeve was added to the existing smartphones to provide 
a secure radio option that mimics the systems the USMC already has available. 
Again, this third stage investment is contingent on satisfactory results from the 
second stage investment and would be made only if those results suggest stage 3 is 
worthwhile. 
Discussion of Results 
The results of this analysis indicate that there is much benefit to be realized 
from taking a staged approach to investment. With the assumption that this program 
would run for 10 years and return an average level of productivity increase, with 
incremental investment in years 3 and 5 only if the prior investments were 
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successful, this analysis produced a potential for $169 million in NPV at a risk of only 
$640,000 for the stage 1 kick-off investment and $12.8 million for stage 2. 
The idea of real options assumes that a small investment will be made 
upfront, with the intention for a large return. However, if the anticipated upsides do 
not emerge, then the investor can exit the investment at a relatively small loss. In 
this case, the investment in 1,000 smartphones in year 1 costs $640,000, with an 
estimated average annual efficiency value of $731,000 for 10 years. The command 
has two years to ascertain whether this benefit is being realized. If so, then the 
command invests an additional $12.8 million in 20,000 more phones. Again, the 
command is given two years to determine whether the projected $14 million in 
annual productivity increases is being realized before making a much larger 
investment. If the benefits are realized, then the final investment is made in year 5. 
This time, the plan is to move tactical by adding the Oceus Networks system and the 
trusted H2 sleeves to the existing smartphones. An Oceus Networks system can 
handle 200 simultaneous calls; thus, we determined that a 50% usage rate, or 50 
Oceus Networks systems, would be needed to support 20,000 users. 
Just as with the prior analyses, it is important to consider the sensitivity of the 
analysis based on the low, average, and high productivity values. Table 18 
demonstrates that even with low realized productivity gains, this program has a 
potential for $54 million in NPV over the full 10-year time span. With a high 
productivity gain, that value could be as high as $425 million. The realized benefit 
will likely fall somewhere between the low and high values. 
The key to this analysis will be in properly capturing and measuring the actual 
productivity gains that accrue, something we do not do in this study but is clearly 
indicated as a key task for future research. 
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Table 18. Real Options Analysis Results 
Low Productivity         
 Option  Years Investment Annual Efficiency NPV 
1,000 smartphones 10  $(640,000)  $366,825   $2,116,744.00 
20,000 
smartphones 8  $(12,800,000)  $7,336,500   $31,007,797.00 
Oceus + sleeves 6  $(44,500,000)  $10,950,000   $20,962,197.00 
Total        $54,086,738.00 
    
Average Productivity   
 Option  Years Investment Annual Efficiency NPV 
1,000 smartphones 10  $(640,000)  $731,205   $5,744,202.64 
20,000 
smartphones 8  $(12,800,000)  $14,624,090   $88,989,055.14 
Oceus + sleeves 6  $(44,500,000)  $21,827,000   $74,863,966.30 
Total        $169,597,224.09 
    
High Productivity   
 Option  Years Investment Annual Efficiency NPV 
1,000 smartphones 10  $(640,000)  $1,467,300   $13,072,154.00 
20,000 
smartphones 8  $(12,800,000)  $29,346,000   $206,118,978.00 
Oceus + sleeves 6  $(44,500,000)  $43,800,000   $205,848,414.00 
Total        $425,039,546.00 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The purpose of this analysis was to explore the application and implications of 
commercial smartphone technology in a tactical environment. As the USMC reduces 
its force structure over the coming years, the expectation for capabilities of a smaller 
force has not diminished. Additionally, as young Marines, people who have grown up 
with smartphone technology, enter the force, their personal expectations will shape 
the new force. 
In this analysis, we looked at the application of commercial smartphone 
technology from several different angles. These included commercial smartphones 
used strictly in a home-base environment, as well as smartphones supplemented by 
a secure tactical sleeve that can integrate with existing USMC equipment. This 
analysis also took the approach of a phased deployment of the technologies into 
squad-, company-, and division-level organizations. 
The main conclusion we draw is that the business case for deploying sleeved 
smartphones in the tactical environment may complement the military rationale for 
adopting this technology. It is the dual-use potential of this technology that makes 
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the economics more attractive than the existing radios USMC has available. Sleeved 
smartphones may also be outright cheaper than existing equipment, and we have 
assumed that to be the case in our analyses. But the bigger benefit of smartphones 
will be in how they enable Marines to fight better when deployed, and work smarter 
when at home base (i.e., if they create options for innovation).  
A secondary conclusion concerns the implementation plan and, in particular, 
uncertainty about what the productivity benefits of smartphones might—or might 
not—be. Based on extant research we have examined the economic benefits of 
smartphone adoption, but there is no substitute for trialing the technology to find out 
where the benefits lie for Marines. Therefore, we conclude that at this point, a staged 
investment approach would be a good choice for the USMC: for example, adopting 
1,000 smartphones across a wide variety of users. This limited adoption would allow 
for a closer examination of the productivity benefits of smartphones in a variety of 
actual working environments. The USMC would retain the option to quit if the results 
are poor, or to invest in a large-scale roll-out if the results of the initial tests prove 
smartphone economics are worthwhile. 
Although the focus of this report is on economic analysis, and therefore the 
productivity potential of smartphones, this is not to say that there aren’t also 
significant tactical benefits of smartphones, such as faster and more accurate 
communication, improved information availability resulting in better situational 
awareness lower in the ranks, and benefits from automatic GPS functioning and 
possible monitoring/telemetry devices. These are further investment options for 
military commanders to consider if the base capabilities of smartphones prove 
attractive.   
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